The introduction provides an analytical framework; sections at the beginning of each chapter summarize the articles and discuss their relationship to the broader study of political economy.
Modern Political Economy and Latin America is intended for use in undergraduate and graduate-level courses in political science and economics.
This paper examines a less studied mode of influence: private regulation, defined as voluntary efforts by firms to restrain their own behavior.
We argue that firms can use modest private regulations as a political strategy to preempt more stringent public regulations.
Relatively modest VEPs dissuaded all three groups from seeking more draconian government regulations, a finding with important implications for social welfare.
We observed these effects most strongly when all companies within an industry joined the voluntary effort.
Overall, our experiments in two important democracies imply that citizens can affect policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who Previous research has emphasized corporate lobbying as a pathway through which businesses influence government policy.
Our findings shed new light on the politics of war in democracies, and may provide behavioral foundations for peace among human-rights-respecting states. Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have economically self-interested preferences about trade policy.